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Abstract
Around 97% of climate scientists endorse anthropogenic global warming (AGW),
the theory that human activities are partly responsible for recent increases in
global average temperatures. Clearly, this widespread endorsement of AGW
is a reason for non-experts to believe in AGW. But what is the epistemic sig-
nificance of the fact that some climate scientists do not endorse AGW? This
paper contrasts expert unanimity, in which virtually no expert disagrees with
some theory, with expert consensus, in which some non-negligible proportion
either rejects or is uncertain about the theory. It is argued that, from a layper-
son’s point of view, an expert consensus is often stronger evidence for a the-
ory’s truth than unanimity. Several lessons are drawn from this conclusion,
e.g. concerning what laypeople should infer from expert pronouncements,
how journalists should report on scientific theories, and how working scien-
tists should communicate with the public.
Keywords: consensus, unanimity, dissent, expertise, science communication.
1
1 Introduction
According to recent studies, an overwhelming plurality of climate scientists en-
dorse anthropogenic global warming (AGW), the theory that human activities are
causally responsible for recent increases in global average temperatures. In a par-
ticularly well-known study (Cook et al., 2013), 97.1% of abstracts in climate sci-
ence journals that took a position on AGW endorsed it (see also Cook et al., 2016).
The fact that so many of the relevant experts endorse AGW is a strong reason for
laypeople to believe in AGW, especially in light of the fact that climate scientists
are a cognitively diverse community of researchers who disagree on a host of re-
lated issues (Oreskes, 2007; Odenbaugh, 2012; Dellsén, 2018). But what is the
epistemic significance, from a layperson’s point of view, of the fact that around
2.9% of climate scientists do not endorse AGW, by rejecting it (1.9%) or by being
explicitly uncertain about it (1.0%)? Put differently, what should we make of the
fact that 97.1% rather than 100% of climate scientists endorse AGW?
More generally, we may distinguish between expert unanimity, in which vir-
tually none of the relevant experts disagrees with some theory, with expert con-
sensus, in which some non-negligible proportion of the experts either rejects or is
uncertain about the theory.1 Which type of opinion distribution among scientific
experts, unanimity or consensus, is stronger evidence for the relevant theory from
the point of view of a layperson who isn’t in a position to evaluate the theory for
herself? This paper argues that, all else being equal, a mere consensus on a theory
is often stronger evidence for the theory from a layperson’s point of view than
unanimity would be. Put differently, the presence of a marginal level of dissent
among the relevant experts should often increase a layperson‘s confidence in the
relevant theory. For example, the 97.1% consensus on AGW is plausibly stronger
evidence for AGW, from a layperson’s point of view, than a 100% agreement on
1Thus, what I am calling ‘consensus’ is closer to Miller’s (2013, 1297) definition of the term
than Tucker’s (2003, 511); indeed, Tucker’s ‘consensus’ corresponds to my ‘unanimity’.
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the theory would be in otherwise identical circumstances.2
As I discuss in more detail below, this conclusion has far-reaching implica-
tions for the ways in which and expert testimony, e.g. from scientists, ought to
be received by the public. Rather than being somewhat skeptical of consensus
theories with which some small minority of relevant experts disagrees, laypeople
should typically be more confident in such theories as compared to unanimously
accepted theories. The argument below also implies that science journalists, and
scientists themselves, ought to communicate scientific results in a different man-
ner than they often do. For example, the journalistic practice of ‘balanced re-
porting’, where opposing viewpoints are given equal weight in media, effectively
presents consensus theories (i.e., overwhelmingly accepted theories about which
there is nevertheless some disagreement) as ‘open questions’ to be debated fur-
ther, whereas unanimously accepted theories (i.e. theories about which there is
no disagreement) are presented as ‘settled fact’. If the argument of this paper is
sound, it should often be the other way around.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by discussing and
elaborating on two well-known facts about theory assessment in science, viz. that
scientists are fallible in their evaluation of theories, and susceptible to conformity
due to social pressure from other scientists. The next two sections are devoted to
spelling out the argument for my central thesis. In section 3, I lay out an infor-
mal version of the argument, to convey an intuitive sense of the key idea and to
foreshadow the official, formal version of the argument. In section 4, I then go
on to spell out this formal version of the argument in a probabilistic, or Bayesian,
2This argument differs from my earlier argument (Dellsén, 2018) that the extent to which ex-
pert consensus on a theory provides laypeople with a reason to believe that it is correct may be in-
creased by expert disagreement on other theories within the same domain of expertise. The argu-
ment of this paper, by contrast, is that some expert disagreement on the consensus theory itself in-
creases the extent to which laypeople have reason to believe that the theory is correct. Thus, for ex-
ample, the current paper aims to show that some disagreement on AGW gives laypeople a greater
reason to believe in AGW, whereas my earlier paper (Dellsén, 2018) argued that disagreements on
other theories in climate science give laypeople a greater reason to believe in AGW. (These argu-
ments are of course compatible – indeed, complementary.)
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framework. Finally, in section 5, I go on to draw various morals from this argu-
ment, concerning (i) how laypeople should assess theories like AGW in light of
the 97% consensus among climate scientists, (ii) what journalistic norms ought
to be adopted for science reporting on scientific theories, and (iii) how scientists
themselves should communicate with the public.
2 Theory Assessment: From Naïvité to Nuance
Let me start with a preliminary point. This paper concerns the general question of
which type of opinion distribution among experts, unanimity or consensus, pro-
vides laypeople with the most reason to believe a given claim. As my introductory
remarks suggest, however, I will take the scientific expert as a paradigm case of the
kind of expert with which I am concerned.3 There are a several reasons for this.
First, I am interested in the kind of agents that laypeople can identify relatively
easily as experts within a given domain; I’ll assume that this is true of scientific
experts in so far as laypeople can access information about their academic qual-
ifications, affiliation, research output, or other relatively transparent indicators.
Second, the experts I am concerned with will be able to provide testimony to non-
experts concerning the truth-value of theories, or their estimation thereof; and I
take it that scientific experts are generally able to do this — perhaps in contrast to,
e.g., expert craftspeople. Finally, it seems to me that if the argument below is con-
vincing when applied to scientific experts it will be even more convincing when
applied to non-scientific experts, roughly because the type of considerations to
which the argument appeals — viz., that such experts are individually fallibility
and susceptible to social conformity effects — will be even more plausible in the
case of non-scientific experts.
So how are scientific claims — or ‘theories’, as I shall simply call them — in
3I do not have any specific account of expertise; rather, what I say should be consistent with
any plausible account of what it is to be an expert in a given domain (e.g. Goldman, 2001; Scholz,
2009).
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fact assessed, i.e. accepted or rejected, on the basis of scientific evidence?4 It will
be instructive for what follows to start by considering a very naïve model of how
such theory assessment works in science. On this naïve model, each individual
scientist evaluates scientific theories in isolation from other scientists, so that one
scientist’s assessment of the theory has no effect on another scientist’s assessment;
moreover, each scientist is perfectly reliable in their assessments, so that a cor-
rect theory is necessarily accepted and a false theory is necessarily rejected. If
this model was accurate, correct theories would, once they been proposed and as-
sessed, inevitably become unanimously accepted. Given this model, unanimity
among scientists would be an excellent — indeed, impeccable — indicator of a
correct theory. Laypeople would thus be well advised to view unanimity among
scientists as the gold standard of reliable scientific testimony.
But of course we know full well that this model is at best a crude simplifica-
tion. What happens when we add some nuance to this model such that it more
closely approximates actual theory assessments in science? Consider first the fact
that scientists do not evaluate theories in isolation from one another. Human be-
ings have a natural tendency towards conforming with groups and communities
to which they belong, by changing their behavior or beliefs to fit those of the
group (see, e.g., Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004).5 Such conformity effects are by far
strongest when the majority is unanimous, and sharply reduced as soon as there
4Here and in what follows, ‘rejecting’ a theory should be understood to involve either accepting
the negation of the theory or being explicitly uncertain about it. Of course, scientific theories may
be assessed in more nuanced ways as well, e.g. by assigning to them a subjective probability or
degree of belief. I have chosen to work with a binary (accept-or-reject) picture of theory assessment
in this paper since the alternative would overly complicate the discussion without adding any
apparent benefits, and since scientists tend to communicate their opinions on scientific theories to
the public in binary ways, i.e. by endorsing the theory or not (rather than e.g. announcing that
the theory should be assigned a particular probability).
5Classic studies of social conformity effects include Jenness 1932, Sherif 1935, Asch 1952, 1956,
and Deutsch and Gerard 1955.
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is any dissent against the perceived majority opinion.6 It goes without saying that
scientists are not immune to such effects, even if contemporary science contains
various mechanisms that are designed to counteract them (Oreskes, 2019). In-
deed, there are some examples in which the social pressure towards conformity
within a scientific group or community has resulted in a ‘bandwagon effect’ (a.k.a.
‘information cascade’) where a theory is widely adopted despite there being only
weak or sparse empirical evidence in its favor.7 For example, in the early 20th
century the renowned French physicist René Blondlot claimed to have discovered
what he referred to as ‘N-rays’, a form of radiation analogous to X-rays. Due pre-
sumably to Blondlot’s status as an authority in French science at the time, several
other French physicists subsequently claimed that they had observed N-rays as
well, making Blondlot’s theory of N-rays widely accepted among French physi-
cists in the early 20th century (Nye, 1980).
Another way in which the naïve model described above is deficient concerns
its assumption that scientists are perfectly reliable. Scientists, even at the best
of times, are sometimes mistaken — a truism often labelled ‘fallibilism’ (e.g. by
Peirce, 1958; Popper, 1965). This is not to deny that scientists are much more
likely to correctly evaluate a given scientific theory than the average person —
after all, they have access to more evidence and are specifically trained to evalu-
ate that evidence. However, assessing a scientific theory inevitably involves some
amount of ‘inductive risk’, in part because scientific methods and instruments are
never perfectly reliable and thus liable to produce misleading evidence (Frost-
Arnold, 2019), and in part because of difficulties involved in interpreting scien-
tific data, e.g. due to unconceived alternatives to extant theories (Sklar, 1981;
Stanford, 2006). Indeed, there are two separate kinds of errors to which scientists
are liable in theory assessments, viz. accepting an incorrect theory (‘false posi-
6See Asch 1951, 1955, Allen and Levine 1968, Allen 1975, Bond and Smith 1996, and Bond
2005.
7For a couple of other examples, along with a game-theoretic explanation of the phenomenon,
see Weatherall and O’Connor 2020.
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tives’) and rejecting a correct theory (‘false negatives’). Although philosophical
discussions of science tend to focus on the first type of error, the second kind of
error — exemplified, for instance, by the rejection of continental drift in the early
20th century (Oreskes, 1999) — is at least as significant for our current purposes.
Of course, the extent to which scientists are fallible varies greatly depending on
the nature of the theory and the state of scientific evidence regarding the theory.
For example, scientists are certainly less prone to making errors about familiar
phenomena about which there is overwhelming evidence (e.g., the Earth’s shape;
tuberculosis) than recently-posited entities or processes about which direct evi-
dence is relatively scarce (e.g., dark energy; schizophrenia). These cases clearly
form a continuum.8 The argument of this paper, according to which consen-
sus provides more support than unanimity, concerns scientific theories for which
there is at least some reason to think scientists would be fallible — due either to
scarcity of relevant evidence or the speculative nature of the theory itself (or both).
Thus this arguably excludes cases such as, for example, the fact that the Earth is
roughly spherical, and that tuberculosis is caused by bacteria. Such ‘theories’ do
not fall within the scope of the argument below because there is no plausible rea-
son for laypeople to suppose scientists would be fallible about such matters at this
point.9
Now, having abandoned the naïve model of scientific theory assessments in
which scientists are unaffected by social influences and necessarily infallible about
8For the purposes of this paper, I leave it open how to locate individual theories on this contin-
uum, since that would effectively require a general account of what makes scientists more and less
reliable in their theory evaluations relative to some evidence. To provide such a general account
would take us too far afield from the main focus of the current paper.
9That said, there was of course a time at which it would have been reasonable for laypeople to
suppose that scientists would be fallible on these matters. For example, there was at least some
reason to suppose scientists would be fallible regarding the cause of tuberculosis before Mycobac-
terium tuberculosis could be isolated and examined through a microscope. What has changed be-
tween then and now is of course that evidence (e.g. microscopic observations) has accumulated to
such an extent that it is no longer reasonable to suppose scientists are fallible to any significant
degree regarding the cause of tuberculosis.
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the relevant theories, it becomes less clear how laypeople should assess scientific
theories on the basis of scientific testimony. Due to the combined effects of social
conformity and fallibility, an incorrect theory may gain widespread acceptance
(e.g. Blondlot’s theory of N-rays); and, conversely, a correct theory may fail to
be widely accepted (e.g. the theory of continental drift). So what distribution
of opinion among experts is such that, all else being equal, laypeople should be
most confident that the theory is true? For all I have argued so far, the answer
to this question may still be unanimity, but this no longer follows trivially from
our model of scientific theory assessment. Indeed, my task below is to argue that
this answer is incorrect, and that a weaker form of plurality of opinion among ex-
perts — viz. what I am calling consensus — is, all else being equal, a more reliable
indicator of truth than unanimity.
3 An Informal Foreshadowing of the Argument
When a layperson considers a given scientific theory, such as AGW, she will often
have little or no direct empirical evidence to which she could reliably appeal in
assessing the theory. By contrast, such a layperson will often, e.g. in the case of
AGW, have information about the relevant experts’ opinions about the theory. In
this type of situation, the layperson lacks any evidence with which to assess the
theory other than an expert opinion distribution about the theory. Clearly, the fact
that a majority of experts accepts a theory is, in the absence of some special in-
formation about the unreliability or dishonesty of those experts, some evidence
for the truth of theory in this situation. However, our current concern is with the
contrast between two different expert opinion distributions both of which consti-
tute a majority, viz. a (strict) unanimity and a (mere) consensus. Which expert
opinion distribution, unanimity or consensus (both of which go beyond a simple
majority), provides a stronger inductive evidence for T ?
Plainly, there is no simple answer to this question that generalizes to absolutely
all cases. As I discuss below, there are a number of factors that influence how
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strongly an expert opinion distribution on a theory supports that theory. These
are brought out in the formal treatment of the issue (see section 4). What I hope
to do in this section, however, is to motivate — informally, for now — the thought
that there is a wide range of cases in which expert consensus provides a stronger
argument for a theory than unanimity would do in an otherwise identical situa-
tion. Thus the informal argument of this section is not meant as anything like a
definitive proof of the paper’s main conclusion. Rather, the discussion of this sec-
tion serves to foreshadow the formal argument provided in the following section,
and to convey an intuitive sense of the argument that is to come.
For the purposes of this section, I will be operating with qualitative rather than
quantitative definitions of ‘unanimity’ and ‘consensus’. So I do not identify ‘una-
nimity’ with 99-100% agreement, for example, or ‘consensus’ with 90-98% agree-
ment. Rather, I will take ‘unanimity’ to refer to an opinion distribution in which
there is no or virtually no disagreement with the majority position, i.e. in which
all or almost all of the relevant experts have the same opinion on a theory; and
I will take ‘consensus’ to refer to a distribution in which there is some substan-
tial disagreement with the majority position. This qualitative pair of definitions
is appropriate in the informal version of the argument given in this section since
informal reasoning of the type employed here does not enable us to make the
type of quantitative comparisons in evidential support that would be necessary
to determine whether a specific numerical expert opinion distribution provides
greater or lesser evidence than another numerical expert opinion distribution.10
Now, consider (informally) what seems to be inferable from expert unanimity,
on the one hand, and expert consensus, on the other other. In both cases, a ma-
jority of experts favor T , which arguably counts in favor of T in both cases. But
since this is common ground between the cases we are comparing (i.e. between
unanimity and consensus) let us set it aside here — e.g. by supposing that our
10If we want to make comparisons with that level of precision, we will need to do so in a quan-
titative framework for non-deductive reasoning such as the Bayesian framework employed in
section 4.
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layperson has already adjusted her opinion in T to reflect the that a majority of
the relevant experts accept T . The question, then, is how much additional sup-
port is provided by the information that the relevant experts unanimously accept
T , on the one hand, versus the information that there is a mere consensus on T ,
on the other hand?
To get at this issue, let us start by focusing not on what can be directly inferred
from this about the truth or falsity of T , but rather what can be inferred about the
process by which each (majority) expert opinion distribution emerged, i.e. what
causally explains each distribution. In particular, consider the hypothesis that
once a simple majority of the relevant experts come to accept a theory T , all or
nearly all of the the other experts (i.e. those that had not yet formed an opinion,
and those who had formed a contrary opinion, on T ) deferred to the majority
opinion:
Groupthink: Once an expert majority arose on T , virtually all of the other
experts formed opinions about T irrespective of the scientific evidence, by un-
critically adopting the majority opinion on T .
Note that Groupthink does not just claim that some of the other experts relied
on the majority opinion to some extent; rather, it asserts that, with respect to T ,
nearly all of those other experts completely relied on the majority in this way. For
example, in a group of 100 experts in which a majority of 51 experts accept T ,
Groupthink implies that virtually all of the remaining 49 experts would defer to
the majority opinion in favor of T . Note also that Groupthink does not directly
address the issue of whether T is correct or incorrect — which is ultimately what
our layperson is interested in. That said, its correctness is clearly relevant to the
correctness of T itself, as we shall soon see.
For now, consider how a layperson should evaluate Groupthink in light of
each of our two types of expert opinion distribution on T , viz. unanimity and
consensus. Consider unanimity first. This opinion distribution would be plau-
sibly explained by Groupthink since a group of experts in which the majority
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opinion is uncritically adopted by all or almost all of the other experts will nat-
urally be led to unanimous opinion distributions, where all or almost all experts
agree. Contrast this with a mere consensus, i.e. with a situation in which there
is some dissent against an otherwise overwhelming majority on T (such as the
2.9% dissent against the consensus on AGW). This opinion distribution would
not be as plausibly explained by Groupthink, since (to repeat) a group of experts
in which the majority opinion is uncritically adopted by all or almost all of the
other experts will naturally be led to unanimous opinion distributions, which ex-
cludes the type of dissent that is involved in a mere consensus. In sum, then, if
Groupthink is correct with regard to a given theory T , we should expect expert
unanimity, rather than consensus, on T . It follows that expert unanimity supports
Groupthink more strongly than expert consensus.
This is in turn relevant to the extent to which a layperson can reasonably take
a given expert opinion distribution as an indicator that T is correct. Roughly,
this is because the extent to which experts have formed their opinions indepen-
dently of each other contributes to their collective reliability in assessing T , in
that agreement reached by a group of more independent thinkers is more likely
to be correct than an otherwise identical agreement reached by more dependent
thinkers.11 Thus, all else being equal, a layperson has less reason to believe that T
is itself correct given a majority expert opinion in its favor if they have reason to
think Groupthink is the correct causal explanation of the expert opinion distri-
bution on T . Add to this our previous conclusion that laypeople have more reason
to believe that Groupthink is the correct explanation in cases of unanimity on T
than in cases of mere consensus on T , and we get that there is a respect in which
unanimity provides less reason to believe T than consensus. Put differently, there
is an epistemic advantage to expert consensus over unanimity, in that the latter
11See, for instance, Goldman 2001 and Dellsén 2020. This is related to the well-known upshot
of the Condorcet Jury Theorem that under certain conditions a group of independent and indi-
vidually competent agents is more likely to be correct in a majority vote than any of the group’s
proper subsets (see, e.g., List and Goodin, 2001).
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but not the former supports Groupthink, which in turn undermines T .
This concludes the informal foreshadowing of the argument that consensus of-
ten provides laypeople with more support than unanimity. Although I hope it
conveys an intuitive sense of how consensus could be superior to unanimity in an
important respect, the argument is clearly incomplete as it stands. After all, even
if there is a respect in which unanimity provides less reason than consensus to be-
lieve T — i.e., even if there is an epistemic advantage to consensus over unanimity
— there might still be other respects in which unanimity provides a greater reason
to believe T — i.e., there might still be other epistemic advantages to unanimity
over consensus. In particular, the fact that a greater number of experts accept T
in cases of unanimity is plausibly itself such an epistemic advantage to unanim-
ity over consensus. So why not think that the epistemic advantage to consensus
over unanimity is always and everywhere outweighed by an opposite epistemic
advantage to unanimity over consensus?
Since this question concerns whether one kind of epistemic advantage is stronger
than another, answering it requires us to appeal to a framework for inductive rea-
soning that allows for quantitative comparisons. That is, we must situate the
argument within a framework that allows us to determine, not just whether a
given piece of evidence provides a reason to believe something, but how strong
that reason is as compared to some other reason. The obvious candidate for such a
framework is Bayesian Confirmation Theory, so let us now turn to formulating the
informal argument outlined in this section within that quantitative framework.
12For the purposes of this paper, there is no need to further assume that rational agents are re-
quired to to update their credences in light of new evidence in accordance with Bayesian Condi-
tionalization, although such a diachronic requirement is often added.
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4 A Formal Version of the Argument
For our purposes, the core claim of Bayesian Confirmation Theory (BCT) is that that
the opinions of perfectly rational agents are, or can be represented as being, sub-
jective probabilities, i.e. degrees of beliefs that satisfy the axioms of probability.12
To this BCT adds an explication of the concept of ‘confirmation’ (or ‘support’),
according to which E confirms (supports) H just in case conditionalizing on E
raises the probability of H , i.e. P (H |E) > P (H). Additionally, since our concern
is with the comparative support conferred on a theory from two different pieces
of evidence that a layperson could come to possess, viz. expert unanimity and
expert consensus respectively, we need a general, quantitative measure of confir-
mation.13 For reasons given by Fitelson (2001, 40-48), I favor the log-likelihood
ratio measure of quantitative support:14
l(H,E)B log
[
P (E|H)
P (E|¬H)
]
Clearly, this relativizes confirmation, and degrees of confirmation, to a given
probability function P (·), corresponding to the agent’s probability distributions.
This highlights a notorious limitation of BCT, which is that it is unclear how to dis-
13A number of ordinally non-equivalent such measures have been proposed in the literature —
see Fitelson (1998) for an overview of these measures. This is not the place to argue in favor of
any particular such measure, which would take us too far afield.
14The log-likelihood ratio measure is ordinally equivalent to the simpler likelihood measure:
l′(H,E)B
P (E|H)
P (E|¬H)
However, the log-likelihood ratio measure l has various technical and aesthetic virtues over its
simplified cousin l′ . (For example, l′(H,E) = 0 when P (H |E) = P (H), i.e. when E provides no
confirmation toH .) Since the two measures are ordinally equivalent, any comparative claim of the
sort I will make below holds for l if and only if it holds for l′ .
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tinguish intuitively acceptable from unacceptable probability functions.15 Rather
than trying to solve that problem here, I will seek to identify seemingly reasonable
conditions on probability functions for which the central claim of this paper —
that expert consensus supports theories more than unanimity, from a layperson’s
point of view — is validated in BCT.
As in the informal version of the argument discussed above, the key argumen-
tative move is to consider how unanimity and consensus support different expla-
nations of how the experts came to have the opinion distributions they in fact
have. So let G correspond to the explanatory hypothesis of Groupthink, i.e. that
once a majority of the experts came to accept T , virtually all of the other experts
formed opinions about T by uncritically adopting the expert majority opinion on
T . The denial of this claim, ¬G, holds that the other experts evaluated T at least
somewhat independently of the majority opinion. In what follows, we take it as
part of the layperson’s corpus of background evidence, common to any evidential
situation considered below (and therefore suppressed in the probabilities consid-
ered below), that some majority of experts accept T ; what differs between these
situations is how large a majority accepts T .16 Given this background knowledge,
G in effect implies that any additional endorsement of T among the relevant ex-
perts is worthless as a guide to whether T is true, since these remaining experts
simply echo the majority (whose opinions have already been taken into account).
Formally, where Ex is the claim that some unspecified proportion of the relevant
experts, beyond a simple majority, accept T , G ‘screens off’ the support for T that
15Indeed, for this reason, some Bayesians (e.g., Howson, 2000; Strevens, 2004) hold that BCT is
merely a bare-bones framework for non-deductive reasoning that will need to be supplemented
with substantive assumptions about acceptable probability functions if it is to deliver any inter-
esting results about rational non-deductive reasoning.
16That is, if M signifies the proposition that some majority of the relevant experts accept T ,
then any unconditional probability P (X) discussed below should implicitly be understood to equal
the conditional probability P (X |M), and any conditional probability P (X |Y ) should implicitly be
understood to equal P (X |Y&M).
14
might otherwise be provided by the relevant expert opinion distribution:
P (T |Ex&G) = P (T |G) (∗)
In most cases, it will be reasonable for laypeople to assign a very low probabil-
ity toG, so the possibility that the experts have engaged in this type of groupthink
will play a relatively minor role in a layperson’s epistemic life. However, the ex-
pert opinion distribution itself can effect the extent to whichG is a live possibility.
Indeed, this is the key idea behind the Bayesian version of the argument: Under
certain natural assumptions about layperson’s probability assignments, an expert
unanimity on T raises the probability of G to a greater extent than does a mere
expert consensus on T ; and since G screens off any opinion distribution regard-
ing T , this in turn makes expert unanimity a less potent probability-raiser of T
as compared to expert consensus. To spell out this key idea, I will use the log-
likelihood measure of confirmation to compare the degree of support for T pro-
vided by one opinion distribution, Eu , as compared to another, Ec. These opinion
distributions may intuitively be thought of as corresponding to ‘unanimity’ and
‘consensus’ respectively (and I will often refer to them as such in what follows).17
To be clear, my claim is not that Ec (consensus) invariably provides more support
than Eu (unanimity), i.e. that l(T ,Ec) > l(T ,Eu) holds for any probability function
P (·); rather, it is the much more modest claim that this holds under conditions on
such probability functions that can be independently motivated as reasonable for
laypeople to have in many instances.
To convey an intuitive sense of how to understand the results that follow, I will
start with a simple toy example of maximally specific set of conditions in which
17With that said, the formal results below apply regardless of what specific levels of agreement
Eu and Ec are taken to refer to in a given case. There is therefore no need to define ‘unanimity’
and ‘consensus’ for the purposes of the current section.
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l(T ,Ec) > l(T ,Eu).18 Suppose a layperson is interested in a theory T on which there
are, say, 100 experts in total. Our layperson knows already that there is a major-
ity of some sort in favor of T , i.e. at least a simple majority of 51 experts accept
T . Moreover, our layperson recognizes that it is epistemically possible for the re-
maining experts to accept a theory because of an extreme form of groupthink, i.e.
because virtually all of the experts follow the lead of the majority rather than crit-
ically evaluating the evidence. Thus the layperson assigns a non-zero probability
to G, e.g. 0.01. And since groupthink will naturally tend to lead to more extreme
opinion distributions within the group, the agent rationally assigns a higher prob-
ability to more extreme opinion distributions conditional on G. For specificity, let
us assume that our layperson assigns likelihoods for 80 to 100 agents accepting
T , conditional on G, as shown in Figure 1. Furthermore, our layperson also ac-
knowledges that experts are fallible, even in cases where their opinions are not
explained by groupthink. Thus, conditional on ¬G, it is unlikely from the layper-
son’s point of view that all of the experts will accept T given that T is true —
although it is even less likely that they all accept T given that T is false. Again for
specificity, suppose the relevant likelihoods are as shown in Figure 1.19
Given these assumptions about our layperson’s probability assignments, one
can calculate20 the degree to which various expert opinion distributions would
confirm the theory T by our layperson’s lights — see Figure 2. Notably, the degree
of confirmation conferred on T is not simply proportional to, or even monoton-
18Let me emphasize at the outset that the results that I appeal to in what follows are not derived
from assumptions about this toy example, so my argument below does not rely on it in any sub-
stantial way. Rather, I include a discussion of this toy example only for illustrative purposes, to
convey an intuitive sense of how the argument of this section works.
19In this example, our layperson expects the expert opinions, in the absence of groupthink, to
form binomial distribution with modes in 90% and 10% of remaining expert acceptances (beyond
a simple majority) depending on whether T is true or false. These distributions results from
assuming that (i) each remaining expert evaluates the theory completely independently of the
majority, (ii) each such expert is 90% likely to accept T if T is true (and G is false), and (iii) each
such expert is 10% likely to accept T if T is false (and G is false).
20E.g., by using (†) below.
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Figure 1: Likelihoods of different expert opinion distributions in a toy example.
ically increasing with, the number of experts who accept T . Rather, T is most
confirmed by expert opinion distributions that can be described as a mixture of
consensus with some substantial dissent (with 95 experts constituting the con-
sensus on T , and 5 dissenters). This degree of confirmation is noticeably lower
— although still clearly positive — for more uniform opinion distributions, such
as complete agreement (where all 100 experts accept T ). Indeed, for complete
agreement, the degree of confirmation conferred on T is comparable to that pro-
vided by a comparatively modest majority of 86 out of 100 experts accepting T .
So, in this toy example, opinion distributions that would intuitively be thought
of as unanimous are far from being the ideal expert opinion distributions as far
as confirmation of T is concerned from the laypersons’s point of view. Put differ-
ently, the existence of dissent against a consensus position increases the extent to
which T is confirmed by the expert opinion distribution in the example.
This example demonstrates that it is possible for expert consensus to provide
more support than unanimity. But of course it tells us nothing, by itself, about
17
Figure 2: Degrees of confirmation for T given the likelihoods in Figure 1.
the general conditions under which this holds. To get at this more general issue,
note first that given our previous assumption (∗), the quantitative degree of con-
firmation for T provided by a given expert opinion distribution Ex can be written
as a function of the probabilities and likelihoods of G and ¬G as follows:
l(T ,Ex) = log
[
P (Ex|G)P (G) + P (Ex|T&¬G)(1− P (G))
P (Ex|G)P (G) + P (Ex|¬T&¬G)(1− P (G))
]
(†)
This shows that the degree to which a given expert opinion distribution con-
firms T depends on no less than four distinct probabilities, viz. P (G), P (Ex|G),
P (Ex|T&¬G), and P (Ex|¬T&¬G), the last three of which may differ between con-
sensus and unanimity (i.e., they can take on different values when Ex is specified
to be Ec or Eu). Given that l(T ,Ex) has so many ‘moving parts’, what (if anything)
can be said about the general conditions under which under which expert consen-
sus provides stronger support than unanimity, i.e. l(T ,Ec) > l(T ,Eu)?
One way to answer this question is to see what happens when we let some of
18
these terms vary while holding others fixed. The fixed terms thus play the role of
ceteris paribus conditions for theorems connecting the varying terms with degrees
of confirmation of T given consensus and unanimity respectively.
In particular, it is not hard to see that if other terms in (†) are held constant
between Ec (consensus) and Eu (unanimity), the former provides more support
for T than the latter if and only if the likelihood of Ec on T and ¬G is greater than
the corresponding likelihood of Eu (all proofs in the Appendix):
Theorem 1. Let P (Ec|G) = P (Eu |G) and P (Ec|¬T&¬G) = P (Eu |¬T&¬G). Then:
l(T ,Ec) > l(T ,Eu) ⇐⇒ P (Ec|T&¬G) > P (Eu |T&¬G)
Roughly speaking, what this tells us is that, for agents that find it likelier that non-
groupthinking experts evaluating a true theory would reach a consensus on the
theory than unanimity, consensus provides them with more support for T than
unanimity, all else being equal. This partly explains21 why, in our toy example, 95
experts accepting T provides so much more confirmation for T than 100 experts
accepting T , since our layperson in that example assigned a higher likelihood, on
T and ¬G, to 95 experts accepting T than to 100 experts doing so.
Interestingly, a similar theorem can be proved with regard to the likelihood
of consensus versus unanimity arising among groups of experts that engage in
groupthink. As noted, if the other experts in a group defer to an already-established
majority opinion regarding T among their peers, this would lead to more extreme
opinion distributions regarding T , so that the experts would be more inclined to
unanimously accept T . It is thus of interest that if other terms in (†) are held con-
stant between consensus and unanimity, and if the likelihood of consensus and
unanimity on T is greater if T is true than if T is false (as seems eminently rea-
21Another part of the explanation is provided by the next theorem; these two explanations are
then neatly unified in the more general explanation provided by the third theorem below.
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sonable), then consensus provides more support for T than unanimity if and only
if the likelihood of unanimity on G is greater than the corresponding likelihood
of consensus on G:
Theorem2. Let P (Ec|T&¬G) = P (Eu |T&¬G) > P (Ec|¬T&¬G) = P (Eu |¬T&¬G). Then:
l(T ,Ec) > l(T ,Eu) ⇐⇒ P (Ec|G) < P (Eu |G)
Roughly speaking, what this tells us is that, for agents that find it likelier that
unanimity would occur among groupthinking experts (and who find it likelier
that either kind of agreement occurs when the theory is in fact true), consensus
again provides them with more support that unanimity, all else being equal. This
also partly explains why, in our toy example, 95 experts accepting T provides so
much more confirmation for T than 100 experts accepting T , since our layperson
in that example assigned a higher likelihood, on G, to 100 experts accepting T
than to 95 experts doing so.
The two previous theorems assumed as ceteris paribus conditions that some
terms were held fixed between consensus and unanimity, while other were al-
lowed to vary. A final theorem shows how the terms that were allowed to vary
interact with one another.
For this theorem, no ceteris paribus assumptions are made; instead, an idealiza-
tion is required to simplify (†). To motivate this idealization, notice that experts
who do not engage in groupthink will be extremely unlikely to reach either con-
sensus or unanimity on false theories. This is emphatically not to say that experts
cannot reach consensus or unanimity on false theories; rather, it is to say that
if (or when) this happens, it can reasonably be assumed to be because the rel-
evant experts have engaged in some form of groupthink. In effect, this means
22For instance, in our toy example of experts that were assumed to be 90% reliable and inde-
pendent with regard to T (see footnote 19), these likelihoods are between 10−40 and 10−50, and
thus several orders of magnitude smaller than other terms in (†) as applied to Ec and Eu .
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that the likelihood of consensus on a false theory, given lack of groupthink, is
negligible; and likewise for unanimity. Hence, the idealizing assumption that
P (Ec|¬T&¬G) = P (Eu |¬T&¬G) = 0 can be assumed to hold as a reasonable ap-
proximation in most circumstances.22 This gets us a lovely theorem that combines
the insights gleaned from our previous two theorems:
Theorem 3. Let P (Ec|¬T&¬G) = P (Eu |¬T&¬G) = 0. Then:
l(T ,Ec) > l(T ,Eu) ⇐⇒
P (Ec|T&¬G)
P (Eu |T&¬G)
>
P (Ec|G)
P (Eu |G)
Roughly speaking, this tells us is that, for agents that find it negligibly likely that
non-groupthinking agents will reach either kind of agreement on a false theory,
whether consensus confirms more than unanimity depends (i) positively on the
extent to which they find it likelier that consensus would occur for true theories
among non-groupthinking experts, and (ii) negatively on the extent to which they
find it likelier that unanimity would occur among groupthinking experts. In our
toy example, both of these factors were ‘favorable’ to making l(T ,Ec) > l(T ,Eu),
in that P (Ec|T&¬G) > P (Eu |T&¬G) (making the first ratio on the right hand side
larger than 1) while P (Ec|G) < P (Eu |G) (making the second ratio smaller than 1),
which is why consensus is so decisively more confirmatory than unanimity in that
case.
Importantly, however, Theorem 3 also reveals that even when one of these fac-
tors is ‘unfavorable’ to l(T ,Ec) > l(T ,Eu), e.g. when P (Ec|G) > P (Eu |G), this can be
outweighed by the other factor being sufficiently ‘favorable’; in that case, the ratio
of P (Ec|T&¬G) to P (Eu |T&¬G) simply needs to be higher than the ratio of P (Ec|G)
to P (Eu |G). Thus, although at least one of these factors needs to be ‘favorable’ (in
the above sense) in order for l(T ,Ec) > l(T ,Eu) to hold, it is not necessary that they
be both are — and, indeed, one of the factors can be ‘unfavorable’ as long as the
other is sufficiently ‘favorable’ to outweigh that. To illustrate, consider a modi-
fication of our toy example in which our layperson assigns higher likelihoods to
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consensus opinion distributions on groupthink than to unanimity (see Figure 3).
Keeping other features of the example as before, a consensus of around 95 experts
still provides more confirmation for T than a strict unanimity of 100 experts (see
Figure 4). Theorem 3 explains why, since in this modified toy example, we can see
from the steeper downward slope at the right tail of P (Ex|T&¬G) as compared to
right tail downward slope of P (Ex|G) that the ratio of P (Ec|T&¬G) to P (Eu |T&¬G)
is greater than that of P (Ec|G) to P (Eu |G).
Figure 3: Likelihoods of expert opinion distributions in a modified toy example.
Let me conclude this section by briefly considering two objections. First, against
the ‘Bayesian’ approach taken in this section, one might object that each of the
above theorems requires highly unrealistic assumptions, e.g. that our layper-
son assigns zero probability to P (Ec|¬T&¬G) and P (Eu |¬T&¬G) as Theorem 3
requires. Thus, the objection goes, these theorems have no relevance for the ques-
tion of what actual, real-life laypeople should conclude from expert consensus
versus unanimity
In response, while I acknowledge that some of the assumptions made here are
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Figure 4: Degrees of confirmation for T given the likelihoods in Figure 3.
unrealistic, it does not follow that these theorems have no relevance for under-
standing the epistemic situation of real-life agents. These theorems reveal what
sort of factors could contribute to making expert consensus provide a layperson
with more confirmation for a theory than unanimity. In other words, they reveal
what makes it true — when it is true — that l(T ,Ec) > l(T ,Eu). This holds for
real life agents as well as for artificial, idealized agents. Strictly speaking, the full
answer is that l(T ,Ec) > l(T ,Eu) is made true by all of the factors that occur on in
(†), but one way to bring out the way in which it depends on each one is to hold
other factors constant (as in Theorems 1 and 2) or set negligibly small factors to
zero (as in Theorem 3). This is a familiar and useful strategy in science itself, e.g.
in causal modeling,23 so I make no apologies for using the same strategy to bring
out how and when, from a layperson’s point of view, expert consensus confirms
theories more strongly than unanimity.
A second possible objection is that this argument assumes that the laypeople
23See, e.g., Weisberg, 2007, 2013, and Strevens, 2008, 2017.
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in question do not have any information relevant to assessing T other than the ex-
pert opinion distributions regarding T . Strictly speaking, this is of course rarely,
if indeed ever, the case. In the case of AGW, for example, most of us know a lit-
tle about how global mean temperatures have risen since the middle of the 19th
century. Thus, the objection goes, this argument applies only in artificial circum-
stances that are unlikely to arise in the real world.
In response, I submit that while laypeople rarely have no additional informa-
tion with which to assess a theory, they — or rather, we — are quite often in
evidential situations in which expert opinion is much weightier than any other
more direct forms of evidence to which we might have access. Moreover, the di-
rect evidence that one does have access to in such situations will also be available
to the relevant experts, who will be better placed to assess its relevance to T , in
which case expert opinion on T should replace our own assessment of T (Elga,
2007). Indeed, it is only in the very unusual case in which I have strong reason
to believe that the experts have somehow missed an important piece of evidence
that the argument given above would lose much of its force. This is certainly not
true of the consensus on AGW, for instance, where the direct evidence that I have
as a layperson has already been taken into account by the experts whose opinions
I am consulting.
5 Conclusion and Implications
I have argued that, in a wide range of cases, laypeople have more reason to be-
lieve a scientific theory when there is some dissent against a consensus position
than when all or virtually all or the relevant experts take the same position. As I
have noted along the way, there are arguably exceptions to this rule — e.g., if the
‘theory’ in question is not something on which laypeople should expect experts to
24As the scare quotes indicate, however, it is something of a stretch to call the relevant claims
‘theories’ and the relevant agents ‘laypeople’. So these cases may not constitute genuine exceptions
after all.
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ever be mistaken about, or if the ‘laypeople’ have relevant information or insights
that the experts lack.24 Generally speaking, however, a certain marginal level of
dissent among experts should increase a layperson’s confidence in a theory about
which the experts have otherwise reached a consensus, roughly because this in-
dicates that the agreement on the theory in question is less likely to be due to a
conformity effect, i.e. ‘groupthink’. As we have seen, this basic thought can be
fleshed out in both abductive and Bayesian frameworks for non-deductive rea-
soning.
What are the practical implications of this argument? One obvious implication
concerns how laypeople should form opinions about scientific theories, or other
issues on they have access to expert opinion. Specifically, the argument suggests
that laypeople should be most confident that theories are true when the relevant
experts display a mere consensus with some dissent. For example, it is plausible
that the 97% agreement among climate scientists on anthropogenic global warm-
ing (AGW) provides laypeople with a stronger reason to believe in AGW than
what would be provided with a 100% agreement. Relatedly, this shows how mis-
leading it can be to pick out and specifically listen to the opinions of those who
disagree with a consensus position, e.g. the 3% of climate scientists who claim to
be skeptical of AGW. The fact that some such experts can be found should, per-
haps counterintuitively, be seen as a reason to strengthen our conviction in the
consensus theory — provided that there are enough experts on the other side of
the issue to constitute a consensus. For example, the fact that climate deniers
have been able to find and promote individual scientists who disagree with the
consensus on AGW — a common and effective propaganda strategy which forms
part of the ‘tobacco strategy’ (Oreskes and Conway, 2010; Weatherall et al., 2019)
— should not in the least be taken to undermine the credibility of the theory; on
the contrary, it should make AGW all the more credible by laypeople’s lights.
Interestingly, laypeople are not the only group of people for whom the pre-
ceding argument makes a practical difference. Another such group is science
reporters. In recent years, sparked by controversial reporting on issues like cli-
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mate change, journalism scholars have debated how much ‘weight’, e.g. column
inches or on-air minutes, journalist should give to opposing viewpoints on scien-
tific matters (e.g., Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004; Dunwoody, 2005; Dunwoody and
Kohl, 2017).25 Three types of proposals have been most extensively discussed in
the literature (not necessarily under these labels):
Balanced Reporting: Give equal weight to all scientific viewpoints held by
any relevant expert.
Weight-of-Evidence Reporting: Give weight to scientific viewpoints in pro-
portion to the evidence for each.
Weight-of-Experts Reporting: Give weight to scientific viewpoints in propor-
tion to the opinion distribution among relevant experts.
Now, we may ask, how do these journalistic norms stack up in light of the preced-
ing argument that a consensus typically provides more support than unanimity?
Which of these norms ought journalists follow in so far as they want to give their
audience the most accurate impression of the epistemic status of a given theory?
Balanced Reporting is widely criticized for effectively distorting the public’s
perception of the epistemic status of consensus theories, since it strictly speaking
implies that a single dissenter’s viewpoint should be given equal weight as that
of an overwhelming consensus (Gelbspan, 1998; Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004; Fig-
dor, 2018). To this criticism we can now add the further objection that, if this
paper’s argument is sound, the fact that there are some experts on the other side
of an issue does not to any extent suggest that the consensus is on the wrong track;
on the contrary, provided there is nonetheless a sufficiently large consensus, it
suggests the opposite. Thus, Balanced Reporting is even more misleading than pre-
vious arguments against it have suggested. For similar reasons, Weight-of-Experts
Reporting will arguably also be very misleading, in so far as it would give the dis-
senters more weight in the media than the existence of dissenters itself warrants
25See also recent philosophical discussions of the issue in Figdor, 2018 and Gerken, 2020.
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epistemically. For example, if a media outlet used even just 3% of its air time or
column inches channeling climate skepticism, this would still present a skewed
picture of the evidential situation regarding AGW in so far as unanimously ac-
cepted theories are not similarly portrayed in a skeptical light at all. Thus, the
most appropriate of the three norms might well be a form of Weight-of-Evidence
Reporting, especially if ‘evidence’ is interpreted broadly so as to include the sorts
of considerations with which the argument of this paper is concerned.
Finally, the argument of this paper has implications for those whose opinions
are being consulted by laypeople or the media, i.e. the experts themselves. These
include scientists, but also more broadly researchers and academics who serve as
epistemic authorities on various matters. In the case of scientists, there are good
reasons to think that it is often normatively appropriate for working scientists to
dissent in various ways, i.e. to disagree with the consensus position in science and
criticize that position (Intemann and de Melo-Martín, 2018). However, in light of
this paper’s argument, it can also be normatively inappropriate for scientists to
dissent with consensus position in their roles as experts, i.e. when communicating
with the public or with policy makers, because this can give a misleading im-
pression of the state of scientific research in their fields (on this, see also Biddle
and Leuschner, 1015; Biddle et al., 2017; Leuschner, 2018). This suggests that the
ideal way for scientists to interact with laypeople involves refraining from com-
municating their individual opinions on the epistemic status of a given theory,
and instead communicate the consensus position among researchers in their field
(as in, e.g., Joint Statement, 2001; American Association for the Advancement of
Science, 2006); or, more generally, report on the opinion distribution of scientists
working in their field (as in, e.g., Gust et al., 2008; Cook et al., 2013, 2016; Pew
Research Center, 2015).26
26This paper was improved by very helpful written feedback from Dunja Šešelja and three
anonymous reviewers for The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, as well as verbal feed-
back from audiences at the Nils Klim Symposium at the University of Iceland and the philosophy
research seminar at the University of York.
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Appendix: Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. As noted in footnote 14, log-likelihood ratio measure is ordinally equiva-
lent to the simpler measure likelihood ratio measure. Thus we have that, by (†),
l(T ,Ec) > l(T ,Eu) if and only if:
P (Ec|G)P (G) + P (Ec|T&¬G)(1− P (G))
P (Ec|G)P (G) + P (Ec|¬T&¬G)(1− P (G))
>
P (Eu |G)P (G) + P (Eu |T&¬G)(1− P (G))
P (Eu |G)P (G) + P (Eu |¬T&¬G)(1− P (G))
(1)
The theorem assumes that P (Ec|G) = P (Eu |G) and P (Ec|¬T&¬G) = P (Eu |¬T&¬G),
so we may divide through by their denominators (which are equal); then subtract
both sides by P (Ec|G)P (G) (or, equivalently, by P (Ex|G)P (G)); and finally divide
through by (1− P (G)); obtaining P (Ec|T&¬G) > P (Eu |T&¬G), as desired.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. To simplify calculations in what follows, let α = P (Ec|T&¬G)(1 − P (G)) =
P (Eu |T&¬G)(1− P (G)) and β = P (Ec|¬T&¬G)(1− P (G)) = P (Eu |¬T&¬G)(1− P (G)).
We can now write (1) as follows:
P (Ec|G)P (G) +α
P (Ec|G)P (G) + β
>
P (Eu |G)P (G) +α
P (Eu |G)P (G) + β
(2)
Since both denominators are positive, multiplying both sides with their product
gets us:
P (Ec|G)P (Eu |G)P (G)2 + P (Eu |G)P (G)α + P (Ec|G)P (G)β +αβ
> P (Ec|G)P (Eu |G)P (G)2 + P (Ec|G)P (G)α + P (Eu |G)P (G)β +αβ
(3)
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Algebraic manipulations of this inequality gets us:
P (Eu |G)(α − β) > P (Ec|G)(α − β) (4)
Now, note that since 1 − P (G) > 0, it follows from the theorem’s assumption that
α > β. Thus (4) is preserved when both sides are divided by (α − β), giving us
P (Eu |G) > P (Ec|G), as desired.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Our assumption that P (Ec|¬T&¬G) = P (Eu |¬T&¬G) = 0 allows us to write
(1) as follows:
P (Ec|G)P (G) + P (Ec|T&¬G)(1− P (G))
P (Ec|G)P (G)
>
P (Eu |G)P (G) + P (Eu |T&¬G)(1− P (G))
P (Eu |G)P (G)
(5)
Since both denominators are positive, multiplying both sides by the product of
their denominators now gets us:
P (Ec|G)P (Eu |G)P (G)2 + P (Ec|T&¬G)(1− P (G))P (Eu |G)P (G)
> P (Ec|G)P (Eu |G)P (G)2 + P (Eu |T&¬G)(1− P (G))P (Ec|G)P (G)
(6)
Algebraic manipulations (in which we exploit that 0 < P (G) < 1), then gets us:
P (Ec|T&¬G)
P (Eu |T&¬G)
>
P (Ec|G)
P (Eu |G)
(7)
as desired.
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